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AUSTRIA, FINLAND AND SWEDEN AFTER 10 YEARS IN THE EU: 
EXPECTED AND ACHIEVED INTEGRATION EFFECTS 
 
Fritz Breuss 
 
 
Abstract 
Austria, Finland and Sweden – all small highly developed industrial and rich countries – entered 
the EU in 1995. Their macroeconomic performance since then was quite different. Real GDP in 
Finland und Sweden increased faster than in EU average, while those of Austria fell back. Austria 
lost its second rank in GDP per capita (at PPS) and is now the fourth richest EU country; Sweden 
fell back from the seventh to the eight rank, while Finland improved its position from rank 11 to 
nine. In a referendum in September 2003 Sweden refused to take over the Euro, whereas the 
other two countries are members of the Euro area. Ex post model simulations indicate that 
Finland appears to have profited most from EU membership (0.7 percentage point greater annual 
GDP growth since 1995), followed by Austria (+0.4 percent) and Sweden (+0.3 percent). 
 
 
Keywords: European integration; Internal Market; Austria; Finland; Sweden; macro 
model 
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1. Introduction 
In the fourth round of enlargement, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the European Union on  
1 January 1995, bringing the number of member states to 15. The new members were all “rich” 
countries, whereas in the two preceding rounds with Greece (1981) and Portugal and Spain 
(1986) “poor” countries had acceded to the EU. Again, the most recent EU enlargement of 1 May 
2004 decreases the average income per capita of the Union because the 10 new Member States 
are all “poor” countries.  
The accession process of the fourth round of enlargement lasted between three and over five 
years, counting from the submission of the request for EU membership (Austria 17 July 1989, 
Finland 18 March 1992, Sweden 1 July 1991; Norway 25 November 1992, Switzerland 20 May 
1992). Accession negotiations with Finland, Austria and Sweden started on 1 February 1993 
(with Norway on 5 April 1993) and were concluded with accession treaties on 30 March 1994. 
Austria was the first of the new members where accession was approved by a referendum, on 12 
June 1994 by a majority of 66.6 percent of the votes. Finland followed on 16 October 1994 (57 
percent approval) and Sweden on 13 November 1994 (52 percent approval). In Norway, the 
population, for the second time after 1972, voted against EU membership by a 53 percent 
majority. The Accession Acts were formally signed at the European Council under Greek 
presidency in Corfu, on 24 and 25 June 1994. 
As a consequence of the accession of Finland, Austria and Sweden to the EU, the number of 
members of EFTA was reduced from seven to four, three of which belong to the European 
Economic Area (EEA) established on 1 January 1994, Switzerland in a referendum in 1992 
having voted against membership and has since negotiated two Bilateral Agreements with the EU 
which in essence cover the contents of the EEA plus some further elements (Schengen and 
Agreement of interest income taxation) in Bilateral-II. The three new members were integrated 
into the EU on the basis of the Treaty of Maastricht: the Internal Market had been completed by 1 
January 1993 and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was due to start in 1999. Finland 
and Austria have been participating in EMU from the start, while Sweden has so far for political 
reasons not adopted the common currency. 
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This article analyses the experiences Austria, Finland and Sweden have made as members of the 
EU from an economic point of view. The question “what we wanted and what we got” will be 
answered. It is documented that the three countries have performed quite differently but overall 
EU membership was positive. Paradoxically, the economic gains contrast with the bad mood the 
population expresses when asked for their personal experiences with the EU. The experiences of 
the three countries are too specific as to be used as a predictor for the economic outcome of the 
10 new Member States after the EU enlargement of 2004. 
The remainder is organized as follows. The second chapter gives an overview of overall 
economic developments. The third chapter deals with the trade paradox connected with EU 
integration. The fourth chapter reports on life in and with the Internal Market. In the fifth chapter 
we describe the implications of the new economic policy framework and the position towards 
EMU. In the sixth chapter we first discuss the analytical difficulties of isolating integration 
effects ex post and then confront expectations with realized integration effects of 10 years EU 
membership. Finally, new estimates are presented that attempt to isolate and quantify the 
different integration effects in the three countries by simulating theoretical effects with a common 
integration model for all three countries over the period 1993 (start with EU’s Internal Market) to 
2005. 
 
2. Overall economic developments since EU accession 
Three small but rich countries: The fourth round of EU enlargement in 1995, including Austria, 
Finland and Sweden, made the EU „richer“ by 0.4 percentage points, as all three countries , while 
being small with populations between 5.2 (Finland), Austria (8.2) and 9 million (Sweden), are 
among those with the highest per-capita income in Europe (see Table 1). 
 
The most recent Eurostat data on the development of GDP per capita at purchasing power 
standards (PPS) in the three countries show that GDP per capita in Austria and Sweden (relative 
to those of EU-25) decreased, whereas it increased in Finland since EU accession (see Figure 1). 
In 1995, Austria was the second richest country in the EU (index value 129); in 2003 it ranked 
only at the fourth place with an index value of 122 (after Luxembourg 215; Ireland 133 and 
Denmark 123). Sweden’s GDP per capita was 18% higher than EU average in 1995, which was 
rank seven; in 2003 it surpassed EU average only by 15% and ranked eight. After the severe 
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recession at the beginning of the nineties, in 1995 Finland’s GDP per capita was only 6% above 
EU average (rank 11); since then it improved its income position to a level of 13% above EU 
average in 2003 (rank nine). However, also GDP per capita of EU-15 declined since 1995 from 
an index value of 115 to 109 in 2003. 
 
Table 1: Economic indicators for Austria, Finland and Sweden 
 Area 
1.000 
km2 
Popu-
lation 
in 1.000 
GDP 
Bill. 
PPS*) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
PPS*) 
Foreign trade with 
EU**) 
Shares in % of 
total trade 
International 
Competitiveness Position+) 
     Exports Imports GCI MEI  PII TI BCI 
Austria 83.9  8129 202.7 28340 62.2 68.1  17  10 15 22 16 
Finland 338.1  5221 120.6 26340 54.6 55.8  1  3  3  3  2 
Sweden 450.0  8997 205.5 27120 55.2 66.3  3  17  6  4  4 
EU-15 3234.3 381539 8558.9 25420        
EU-25 3972.6 455808 9384.2 23380        
*)  PPS = Purchasing power standards 
**) Average trade shares with EU-14 1995-2003 in % of total trade. 
+) The figures represent the ranks out of 104 listed countries. 
GCI = Growth Competitiveness Index (medium-term macroeconomic approach for sustainable growth); 
GCI consists of 3 sub-indices: 1) Macroeconomic environment index (MEI), 2) Public institutions index 
(PII) and 3) Technology index (TI); BCI = Business Competitiveness Index (microeconomic conditions 
for short-term productivity level). 
Sources: Macroeconomic data: AMECO database of the European Commission; International  
 Competitiveness Position: The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005, World Economic 
 Forum, Geneva, autumn 2004. 
 
 
Corresponding with its high income level the industrial structure is primarily concentrated on 
services. Sweden holds the biggest share of value added in services in % of GDP (70.6%), 
followed by Austria (67.3%) and Finland (65.4%). The share of value added in industry is largest 
in Finland (31.1% of GDP), followed closely by Austria (30.4%) and Sweden (27.5%). The rest 
concerns agriculture: Finland’s share of agricultural value added amounts to 3.5% of GDP, in 
Austria 2.3% and in Sweden only 1.8%. Being advanced small economies the degree of openness 
for trade (the exports to GDP ratio is 35.5% in Austria, 33.8% in Finland and 34.4% in Sweden) 
is larger than in the EU on average. 
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Figure 1: GDP per capita in Austria, Finland and Sweden, 1995-2003 
 (Relative to EU-25 = 100; at PPS) 
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Source: Eurostat, Press release, 145/2004, 3 December 2004. 
 
Different macroeconomic development: An evaluation of the overall development of the three 
new EU member states since 1995 must be made against the background of the general 
development in the world and in Europe. Therefore the primary macroeconomic indicators for 
Austria, Finland and Sweden are compared with a reference small group of countries which are 
not at all directly involved in EU integration (USA and Japan) and with one EFTA country which 
is far away from an EU accession (Switzerland). 
Comparing the development of the three new members with those of EU average one gets a slight 
idea whether the economies of the three newcomers performed better or worse; it is, however, not 
permitted to deduce integration effects from such an exercise. In order to get a rough idea 
whether the economies of the three countries performed fundamentally differently after EU 
accession, for some selected macro variables the average performance ten years after EU 
accession (1995-2004) is compared with those of ten years before (1985-1994). On the one hand, 
such a procedure excludes randomness since both periods encompass roughly two business 
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cycles. On the other hand, since the opening-up of Eastern Europe in 1989 additional effects 
influenced the macro variables chosen. 
Table 2 shows that the three economies performed quite differently. Finland and Sweden could 
increase their GDP growth since 1995 on average compared to the decade before by 2.4 
percentage points and 1.4 percentage points, respectively, whereas in Austria GDP growth was 
lower by 0.8 percentage points on average in the period since 1995. Hence, Austria’s 
development was even worse than those of EU-15 on average (-0.2 percentage points). 
 
Table 2: Macroeconomic developments since EU accession 
 GDP, real 
 
 
GDP per 
capita (PPS**) 
relative to 
EU-15=100 
Inflation rate 
HICP+) 
 
Budget balance 
general 
government 
in % of GDP 
Unemployment 
rate 
in % 
 AV*) D*) AV*) D*) AV*) D*) AV*) D*) AV*) D*) 
Austria 2.11 -0.78 -0.45 -0.77  1.53 -1.09 -1.96  1.44   4.11  0.73 
Finland 3.53  2.35  0.95  2.26  1.45 -2.87  1.69  0.95 11.01  3.35 
Sweden 2.87  1.41  0.16  1.28  1.63 -3.95  0.25  2.32  7.05  3.04 
EU-15 2.20 -0.21  -  0.00  1.95 -2.33 -2.19  2.27  8.74  -0.15 
USA 3.33  0.34  0.32  0.48  2.46 -1.18 -1.63  2.90  5.07  -1.30 
Japan 1.57 -1.91 -0.50 -1.48  -0.06 -1.65 -6.77 -6.81  4.39  1.93 
Switzerland 1.24 -0.46 -1.37 -0.24  0.85 -2.16 -2.19 -  3.19  1.57 
*) AV = average annual growth in the period 1995-2004 in %; D = percentage point differences of average 
growth 10 years after EU accession (1995-2004) compared to 10 years before (1985-1994); budgetary 
balances and unemployment rates are measured in percentage points. 
**) PPS = Purchasing power standards 
+) HICP = consumer price index and harmonized index of consumer prices (in EU Member States) 
Sources: Own calculations using data from the AMECO database of the European Commission. 
 
With the exception of Japan the development of real GDP of the reference countries was better 
than those in Austria since 1995. Considering GDP per capita (at PPS relative to EU-15) – a 
measure of overall welfare of an economy – one gets a similar, even though a more accentuated 
picture. The pattern of the change in the decade after EU accession compared to the period before 
was the same as when using real GDP. Looking only on the development since EU accession, 
Finland could impressively improve its position in GDP per capita compared to EU average. 
Sweden was slightly better and Austria – similar to Japan (!) – suffered a loss in GDP growth 
compared to EU average (see also Figure 1). Switzerland’s outstanding position deteriorated 
considerably vis à vis EU average. In contrast, the United States could enlarge its advantage 
against the EU. 
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The start of the EU Internal Market on 1 January 1993 was, from an economic point of view, by 
no means successful; one is even inclined to call it a "false start" (Figure 2): It fell into a period 
of economic recession in Europe, with real GDP contracting in most EU countries. Finland and 
Sweden – for different reasons - slid into a severe recession in the early nineties. In the wake of 
the opening of Eastern Europe in 1989 (the collapse of trade with Russia), Finland slid into the 
most severe recession of the post-war era: real GDP slumped by 6.3, 3.3 and 1.2 percent in 1991, 
1992 and 1993, respectively. However, from the trough activity rebounded steeply and since 
1995 annual growth rates have been in the range from 4 to 6 percent. Sweden also struggled 
against recession between 1991 and 1993, which was triggered by a crisis in the banking sector in 
the context of financial liberalization; activity hit its low in 1993, real GDP having declined by 
1.1 percent in 1991, 1.7 percent in 1992 and 1.8 percent in 1993. Since then, the economy has 
recovered, albeit at a lower pace of growth than in Finland. In both countries the catch-up in GDP 
growth was also accompanied by a fundamental reform in the social security system. The 
Austrian economy performed much more steadily, though it was also hit by the recession of 
1993, however, less severe than in the EU. Still, real GDP did not fall in that year (+0.4 percent), 
and from 1994 Austria participated in the general business cycle upturn. In general, Austria’s 
cycle correlates closer to that of EU average than those of Finland and Sweden. Due to special 
events in the three countries (recession before EU accession in Finland and Sweden; growth 
bonus in Austria in the early years of German unification) the comparison of the growth 
performance 10 years after with 10 years before EU accession cannot be completely assigned to 
EU membership. 
In all countries included in Table 2, the inflation rate since 1995 declined compared to the decade 
before, the least in Austria (-1.1 percentage points). Inflation abated most significantly in Sweden 
(-4 percentage points), followed by Finland (-2.9 percentage points). In EU-15, inflation abated 
by 2.3 percentage points. As can be seen from Figure 3, the improvements in Sweden and 
Finland are mainly due to the high initial level in the early nineties. In contrast, Austria was 
always more price stable than the EU on average. The fact that the Euro did not spur inflation in 
both Euro countries Austria and Finland is documented by the fact their average inflation rate 
was lower than that in Sweden (see Table 2). 
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Figure 2:  Economic growth before and after EU accession 
 (Real GDP, percentage change from previous year) 
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Source: Data from the AMECO database of the European Commission. 
Figure 3:  Inflation before and after EU accession 
 (Harmonized index of consumer prices, percentage change from previous year) 
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Source: Data from the AMECO database of the European Commission. 
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In all three countries the budgetary position improved, i.e. the surpluses in the general 
government budget increased in Finland or the deficits declined in Austria and Finland. However, 
the improvement was less pronounced than in the EU-15 on average. As the longer-term 
development shows the severe recessions in Finland and Sweden left its marks also in their 
budgets (see Figure 4). Only after the growth catch-up and the reform steps in the social security 
system the budget balances improved significantly in both countries; since the end of the nineties, 
they exhibit surpluses. The improvement in the budgetary position of Austria since the mid-
nineties was not so much due to the upturn in the business cycle – like in Finland and Sweden – 
but a necessary condition for becoming a member in EMU right from its start in 1999; a sound 
budgetary position was one of the Maastricht convergence criteria. 
 
Figure 4:  Budgetary performance before and after EU accession 
 (Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-), general government, in % of GDP) 
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Source: Data from the AMECO database of the European Commission. 
 
In the eighties, Austria’s labor market situation was already better than those in the Scandinavian 
countries with only a slight increase of the unemployment rate. The high jumps in the 
unemployment rate in Finland and Sweden in the early nineties were the direct consequence of 
the severe recession (see Figure 5). Since then the situation improved, however, the 
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unemployment rates are still higher than in Austria where it is only half that of EU average. EU’s 
unemployment rate declined slightly in the last decade, compared to a more pronounced decrease 
in the United States (see Table 2). 
 
Figure 5:  Unemployment rates before and after EU accession 
 (In percent) 
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Source: Data from the AMECO database of the European Commission. 
 
Global competitiveness – Finland and Sweden dominate:  
While all being rich and highly advanced small economies, the three countries differ markedly in 
terms of their industrial and corporate structures. While Finland and Sweden host multi-national 
companies, the Austrian economy is dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). 
In the list of Europe’s 500 largest companies, according to their market value, set up by the 
Financial Times Deutschland (FT 500), in 2003 Sweden was represented by 23 multinational 
companies. Ten companies ranked under the top 200: Hennes & Mauritz (retail sales) on rank 71, 
TelioSonera (telecommunication) on rank 78, Nordera (financial services) on rank 82, Ericsson 
(IT hardware) on rank 105 etc. Nearly all industrial branches were represented. There is one 
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world company which dominates the firm structure in Finland, Nokia (rank 9). The next largest 
company, Stora Enso (pulp and paper) ranks 132, UPM-Kymmene (paper) is on rank 155 and 
Fortum (oil and gas) on rank 200. Finland is represented with nine companies under Europe’s top 
500. In Austria not a single company ranks in the top 200. On rank 211 is Telekom Austria, on 
rank 242 Erste Bank, on rank 318 OMV (oil and gas) and on rank 457 EVN (electricity). 
This differential structure is also reflected in the assessment of the degree of global 
competitiveness by international business managers, the results of which are summarised 
annually by the World Economic Forum (WEF) in its Global Competitiveness Report. The latest 
issue 2004/05 of the Report shows Finland holding rank 1 as in 2003 among 104 countries 
according to the Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI), Sweden in rank 3 (as in 2003), and 
Austria in both years in 17th place (see Table 1). The WEF first introduced the GCI three years 
ago, in collaboration with Jeffrey Sachs and John McArthur; it is based on three pillars, all of 
which are widely accepted (also based on the insights of the new growth theory) as being critical 
to economic growth: a) the quality of the macroeconomic environment (MEI), b) the state of the 
public institutions (PII), and c) a country’s technological readiness (TI). Austria fares only a little 
bit better in the sub-categories MEI and PII. In TI it ranks only 22. Sweden is rated poorly for its 
macroeconomic environment (rank 17). A similar picture shows WEF’s Business 
Competitiveness Index (BCI). Here, Finland rank is 2, Sweden 4 and Austria 16 (see Table 1). 
As a consequence of the high density of multinational companies, Sweden is ahead as far as 
expenditure on research and development (R&D) is concerned. Its R&D to GDP ratio was 4 ½% 
of GDP in 2002. In Finland the R&D ratio amounted to 3 ½% and in Austria to 2 ¼% of GDP in 
2003 and 2004, respectively (see Figure 7). 
 
3. Trade paradox – why not more intra-EU trade creation? 
Theory: Integration into an existing trade block provokes, as a rule, an increase in trade volumes 
(trade creation) and a diversion of trade flows form the new trade partners towards the new 
partners of EU’s internal market (trade diversion). EU accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
had two trade policy implications: 
(a) The three countries entered into the existing customs union of the EU, their custom tariffs had 
thus to be adjusted to the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) of the EU. For Finland, this implied no 
need for adjustment (on average for manufactures) because it already reached the level of EU’s 
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CCT of 7.5 percent. Sweden had to raise tariffs by around 1 percentage point on average, whereas 
Austria had to lower them by around 5 percentage points. Imports from third countries to Austria 
thereby became cheaper, those to Sweden somewhat more expensive. For all three accession 
countries, bilateral trade of manufactures with the Community had been exempt from tariffs since 
mid-1977 on the basis of the Free Trade Agreement between EFTA and EC of 1972 (EC-EFTA 
Free Trade Zone). Before EU accession (1986-1994), imports from third countries (Non-EU and 
Non-EFTA countries) accounted for some 25 percent of total imports in Austria, 36 percent in 
Finland and 27 percent in Sweden. Multiplying these import shares with the changes in the 
import tariff rates, necessary to adjust to EU’s CCT the effects are small. For Sweden, the trade 
diversion effect should thus have amounted to only about ¼ percent of total imports; in Austria 
the external trade creation effects should have amounted to some 1¼ percent. In Finland, no such 
effect accrued, as tariffs did not have to be changed. 
(b) Entry into the Internal (or Single) Market implied no change in tariffs between the three 
countries and the EC 12 but, because of the dismantling of border controls (free movement of 
goods), a reduction in trade costs in the order of an estimated 2.5 to 5 percent of the total trade 
volume. 
All calculations, either with gravity models or simulations with computable general equilibrium 
models (CGE models) EU accession results in considerable trade creating effects in the long-run. 
Egger (2004) finds in a gravity model approach that the EU accession (measured with a dummy 
variable) should have contributed to an additional intra-EU trade volume of 4 percentage points. 
In the case of NAFTA he finds a trade creating effect of even 15 percentage points. Also with a 
gravity model Badinger-Breuss (2004) estimate that the elimination of tariffs in Europe 
contributed ¼ to the increase in growth of intra-EU trade after the Second World War. Under the 
assumption that the participation in the Internal Market led to a reduction of trade costs 
amounting to 2.5 percent, own simulations with a CGE model (GTAP5 model for 8 regions: 
Austria, Finland, Sweden, Rest-EU, USA, CEEC, CIS and ROW; 10 sectors with 5 factors of 
production) resulted also in strong trade creating effects in bilateral trade with EU-12 and vice 
versa of 5 and 8 percentage points, respectively. The trade creating effects of the three countries 
with each other are somewhat lower, 2 to 3 ½ percentage points. Trade diverting effects 
(reduction in exports and imports) can be detected vis à vis all third countries, the effect is 
strongest between the three countries and third countries, relatively weak it is between EU-12 and 
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third countries (USA, CEEC, CIS, ROW). The GTAP simulations also indicate that due to the 
reduction of trade costs of 2.5 percent, welfare should have improved by ½ percentage point and 
real GDP should have increased by 1/10 of a percentage point in Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
 
Table 3: More Trade Diversion than Trade Creation since EU accession? 
 (Change between 1986/1994 and 1995/2003) 
Exporters/ 
Importers 
Export shares 
(Percentage points) 
Import shares 
(Percentage points) 
Trade balance 
Mill. USD 
with EU-14 
Austria  -4.53  -1.95  -841.2 
Finland  -6.21  -3.02  3942.7 
Sweden  -5.27  2.13  453.3 
with CEEC-10 and CIS (10 New EU Member States) 
Austria -7.36 (5.93)  4.83 (4.44) 1091.4 (1301.2) 
Finland  0.29 (4.58)  0.67 (2.36) 1099.4 (1380.1) 
Sweden  2.99 (2.42)  2.18 (2.64) 1091.4 (  363.3) 
with EFTA-4 
Austria  -1.26  -0.99  856.2 
Finland  -1.25  -0.23  42.7 
Sweden  -1.28  1.06  211.4 
with NAFTA 
Austria  1.04  1.14  80.6 
Finland  1.64  0.45  1305.7 
Sweden  0.15  -2.74  3863.0 
with Other countries 
Austria  -0.90  -3.03  1439.7 
Finland  5.53  2.13  -15363.7 
Sweden  3.41  -2.63  6151.7 
CEEC = Central and Eastern European countries; CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States; EFTA-4 = 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland; NAFTA = Canada, Mexico and USA. 
Source: Own calculations using OECD data: FTMS – Monthly Statistics of Foreign (International) Trade 
and Wifo database. 
 
Reality: A comparison of the trade development of the three countries nine years after EU 
accession with those nine years before shows the following results (see Table 3): Quite in 
contrast to the theoretical expectation trade shares with the EU declined (with the exception of 
the EU import shares in Sweden). Austria is more deeply integrated in the EU Internal Market 
than the other countries (see Table 1). Austria exports 62 percent of its exports to EU-14 (in the 
period 1995-2003) and imports from EU-14 68% of total imports. Finland exports and imports to 
and with EU-14 of around 55 percent. Sweden imports more (66 percent) form EU-14 than it 
exports to it (only 55%). The decline of trade shares is somewhat less with the 4 Rest-EFTA 
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countries. All three countries exhibited a strong trade increase with the former Eastern European 
countries (CEEC and CIS), in particular with the 10 new EU Member States. Austria profited the 
most from the opening-up of Eastern Europe since 1989. Interestingly, the trade shares with third 
countries (NAFTA and Other countries) mainly increased, in sharp contrast to the theoretical 
expectation. 
 
Figure 6:  Development of trade balances with the EU: Austria, Finland and Sweden, 1990-2003 
 (Bill. ECU/Euro) 
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Source: Eurostat (homepage). 
 
As a result of these trends, the trade balance with the EU (measured in Mill. USD) improved in 
Finland and Sweden, while it deteriorated in Austria. Vis à vis all other regions the trade 
balanced improved in the decade after 1995 compared to those a decade before (an exception is 
the trade balance of Finland with “Other countries”; see Table 3). Nevertheless, after a 
deterioration shortly after EU accession, the trade balance with the EU (measured in Bio. 
ECU/Euro) showed a strong improving trend in the case of Austria since 1998 (see Figure 6), 
whereas – after a stagnation – it deteriorated in Finland and Sweden, starting in 2000/2001. 
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However, the trade balances with the EU were always in surplus in Finland and Sweden, whereas 
it is still in deficit in Austria. 
There is no easy explanation for this trade paradox. The three countries were already strongly 
integrated into the EU via the Free Trade Agreements of 1973 and the participation in the 
European Economic Area (EEA) since 1994. Therefore, a further improvement was nearly 
impossible. Additionally, the effects of the abolition of border controls may have been much 
lower than expected. The opening-up of Eastern Europe in 1989 – accompanied by the 
asymmetric tariff liberalization with the Europe Agreements (EAs) – created new “emerging 
markets” in the neighborhood. Its immense backlog demand may have been a much stronger 
trade creating effect than the EU integration. Also the weak overall economic development in 
EU-12 dampened the demand for imports from Austria, Finland and Sweden. The income effect 
might have been stronger in the last decade then the usual theoretically dominating relative price 
effect, caused by the abolition of border controls. 
 
Figure 7a:  Real effective exchange rates vis à vis members of the Euro area, 1994-2004 
 (Relative unit labor costs, measured in a common currency; Index, 1994=100) 
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Source: Price and Cost Competitiveness, European Commission, September 2004. 
 
Price competitiveness – measured by the real effective exchange rate (relative unit labor costs) – 
evolved quite differently in the three countries. Within the Euro area Austria could improve its 
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price competitiveness by around 8 percentage points since 1994 (see Figure 7a). Finland and 
Sweden, in contrast deteriorated its position by around 5 percentage points (see also EU, 2004a, 
p. 81). Since the start of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, the situation 
remained constant in Finland, whereas it deteriorated further in the Non-Euro country Sweden. 
A similar picture emerges if one looks at the development of price competitiveness within EU-
25. Since 1994, Austria improved its price competitiveness even by 13 percentage points, Finland 
only by 3 percentage points and Sweden only by 2 percentage points (see Figure 7b). The 
improved competitiveness of the three countries vis à vis EU-24 compared to the Euro area is due 
primarily to the steady real appreciation of the new Member States (with the exception of 
Slovenia), a consequence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect (see Breuss, 2003c). These 
developments might partly explain why the EU export shares declined the least in Austria (see 
Table 3). 
 
Figure 7b: Real effective exchange rates vis à vis members of EU-24, 1994-2004 
 (Relative unit labor costs, measured in a common currency; Index, 1994=100) 
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Source: Price and Cost Competitiveness, European Commission, September 2004. 
 
Modern foreign trade theory claims that with ever closer integration between advanced 
economies of similar factor endowment, the goods traded become themselves more similar. 
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Suppliers try to maintain or increase their market shares through product differentiation, partly in 
order to distinguish themselves from competitors, and partly in order to meet the increasingly 
sophisticated tastes of consumers. This phenomenon is known as "intra-industry" trade (IIT; see 
Breuss, 2003b, pp. 109 ff.). Measured the IIT by the "Grubel-Lloyd Index" conveys the following 
picture for the three new EU members (see Breuss, 2003a, p. 140): Finland exhibits the lowest 
index value among the three (42 percent in 2000), since its supply structure is heavily 
concentrated on two segments, i.e., wood/timber and high-tech products. The share of intra-
industry trade with the EU rose nevertheless until accession, but − interestingly − declined 
thereafter. In Austria (76 percent) and Sweden (69 percent) it continued to rise after EU 
accession, after a temporary levelling-off. 
 
4. Life in and with the Internal Market – grandiose competition effects? 
Problems of transformation and acceptance: The goal of creating a "common market" has 
already been laid down in Art. 2 of the EEC Treaty of 1957. As a matter of fact, the Internal 
Market1 was established only twelve years ago, as from 1 January 1993. Key pillars of the 
Internal Market Programme (IMP or SMP) are the "four freedoms": free movement of goods, 
services, capital, and labour2. The principle of non-discrimination and of mutual recognition of 
industrial norms and standards belongs to its fundaments. The functioning of the Internal Market 
is secured by a uniform competition law. In the course of time, many sectors hitherto dominated 
by state intervention (public utilities such as telecommunication, energy supply, railways postal 
service, etc.) were privatised, requiring wide-ranging adjustment of EU law (directives; for more 
details, see Breuss, 2003a, p. 250). Its transformation into national law required a considerable 
                                                 
1  In the EC Treaty and also in the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” (TCE), Title III the official name 
is “Internal Market” (IM) or “Internal Market Programme” (IMP). Nevertheless, also the Commission uses 
interchangeably for IM the name “Single Market” (SM) or “Single Market Programme” (SMP). See the new Internal 
Marekt homepage - http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/index_en.htm - and the homepage “EU Single Market 
– 10 years” of the European Commission: http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/10years/index_en.htm. 
2  All three countries examined here have acceded to the Schengen Agreement that provides for the free movement of 
individuals, the abolition of border controls and the reinforcement of controls at the external EU frontiers. With the 
integration into the Treaty of Amsterdam (in force since 1 May 1999), the Schengen Agreement has become part of 
EU primary legislation. Finland and Sweden acceded to the Schengen Agreement on 25 March 2001, together with 
the other Scandinavian countries (Norway and Iceland as associated members), which allowed the Nordic Council 
(between Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland) that celebrates its 50th anniversary this year to maintain 
its passport union. In Austria, the Agreement has been in force since 28 April 1995, with border controls being 
phased out in two steps, on 1 December 1997 and 1 April 1998. 
 Austria, Finland and Sweden after 10 Years in the EU: 21 
Expected and Achieved Integration Effects 
 
 
amount of time and was carried out only gradually. 1500 regulations and 377 directives are the 
legal basis of the SMP. 
In the early stages, the "implementation deficit" of EU law was 21.4 percent according to the 
Internal Market Monitor, ten years later it had fallen to 2.1 percent (see EU, 2002a, pp. 5-7; in 
2003 in EU-15 it increased again to 2.9 percent (for EU-25 it was 3.6 percent) as of November 
2004, a long way from the 1.5 percent interim target set by successive European Councils; see 
EU, 2005, p. 17). Sweden had a deficit of 2.0 percent, Austria 2.1 percent and Finland 2.1 
percent. However, although Finland and Sweden have already met the 1.5 percent interim target 
in the past, the transposition deficits got worse, in particular in Finland. If EU directives are 
implemented in an incomplete manner or not at all, the European Commission will initiate an 
infringement procedure. The total number of such procedures is very high, with 1,014 open cases 
in EU-15 as of October 2004. With Austria, there are currently 58 cases pending, as compared 
with 32 for Finland and only 31 for Sweden (see EU, 2005, p. 21). Since 2001, the European 
Commission has published an "Internal Market Index" designed to express the functioning of the 
Internal Market by a single figure (IMI). In 2002, the Index was revised and broadened in scope. 
It consists of a weighted average of 12 indicators that have been selected as representative for the 
functioning of the Internal Market by IMAC, the Commission's Internal Market Advisory 
Committee. In the three new Member States the IMI has risen much faster than in the EU on 
average (see for more details Breuss, 2003a, pp. 539-540). 
With regard to public approval of the EU and the appraisal of the advantages of membership, 
Finland, Sweden and Austria differ markedly. Traditionally, scepticism vis-à-vis the EU has been 
and continues to be highest in Sweden, as witnessed in particular by the country's non-
participation in EMU. According to the latest "Eurobarometer" survey this means the following: 
The question concerning the “Support to the membership of the European Union”, 46 percent of 
the Austrian answer that it is a good thing (18 percent see it as a bad thing and 32 percent see it as 
neither good nor bad). In Finland this relationship is 48 percent to 16 percent (with 35 percent not 
decided) and in Sweden 48 percent to 24 percent (27 percent not decided). In EU-25 on average 
56 percent see EU membership a good thing, 13 percent a bad thing and 28 percent neither good 
nor bad. Only 43 percent of the Austrian sees “Benefits from being a member of the European 
Union”, 45 percent see no benefits and 12 percent are not decided. In Finland this relationship is 
somewhat more favourable (49 percent to 45 percent; 7 percent rest). The Swedish population 
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sees more disadvantages (not benefited) from EU membership (47 percent) than benefits (36 
percent) and 17 percent are not decided. Again these opinions are way below the average of EU-
25: benefited 53 percent, not benefited 34 percent (rest 12 percent; see Eurobarometer, No. 62, 
December 2004, pp. 8-10). 
 
More than 10 years Internal Market and disappointment with the Lisbon strategy: The European 
Union has already more than 10 years experience with the Internal Market. The expected grand 
growth effects have been realized only to a very modest degree (see more in Breuss, 2003b, pp. 
389-398 and EU, 2005). In particular the Internal Market for services is far from being 
completed. Services markets are still highly fragmented. Therefore the European Commission 
proposed a new “Services Directive” in early 2004 (see EU, 2004b). Protest by prominent 
politicians from France and Germany has forced the Commission to draw back its original 
version and to make a new (may be a diluted) proposal. 
In order to speed up the performance of the Internal Market the European Council on its summit 
in Lisbon on 23-24 March 2003 has set itself a “new strategic goal” for the next decade: “to 
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.” The mid-
term review by Kok (2004) and also by the European Commission (see its new Lisbon strategy 
homepage “growth and jobs”: http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/) shows that non of the high 
goals could be fulfilled; neither concerning economic growth (target: annual real GDP growth of 
3 percent), nor concerning employment goals and also not the goal to spend 3 percent of GDP for 
research and development (R&D). The United States out compete Europe in nearly all of the 14 
indicators. This is why the new Commission under president José Manual Barroso launched a 
new start for the Lisbon Strategy on 2 February 2005, concentrating mainly on “growth and jobs” 
(see also Breuss, 2005a and http://europa.eu.int/growthandjobs/). 
 
Has EU membership triggered an increase in competition? This question has been studied at 
least for Austria (see Badinger-Breuss, 2004b) with a detailed sectoral analysis (46 sectors over 
the period 1978 to 2001). It has been tested whether the mark-ups (a measure for the degree of 
market power) have declined since EU accession due to an intensification of competitive pressure 
in the Internal Market. The results are mixed. Only in three of six analyzed industry groups 
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(mining, retail and whole sale, financial services and real estate) the mark-ups declined 
significantly. Out of the 19 branches in which a break in the competitive behavior could be 
detected after EU accession the mark-ups declined in five branches; they increased in nine 
branches; the rest was statistically insignificant. Overall the result was disappointing. One 
interpretation could be that there was no big change for Austrian companies concerning 
competitive pressure when participating in the Internal Market because Austria experienced this 
adaptation already earlier: the Free Trade Agreements of 1973 and the participation in the 
European Economic Area (EEA) led to a high trade integration into the EU. Only those sectors 
which were protected before (food, energy, telecommunication and other formerly state-owned 
industries) were exposed to a strong competitive pressure after EU accession. Badinger (2004) 
obtains similar results for 10 EU member States and 17 sectors. 
 
5. Fundamental changes in economic policy – with or without the Euro 
Similarities: The European Union is (still) based upon a complicated division of responsibilities 
between the EU- or Community level on the one hand and the national level on the other (Breuss, 
2002). Many policy areas are already Community matters, such as competition policy, the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the Common Trade Policy as well as the structural or 
regional policy. In the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” (TCE), the ratification of it 
is under way the division of competences between the Union and the Member States is rules in 
Part I, Title III (Union competences). Accordingly, there are six areas of competences: (1) Areas 
of exclusive competence (of the Union), (2) areas of shared competences, (3) the coordination of 
economic and employment policies, (4) the common foreign and security policy, (5) areas of 
supporting, coordinating or complementary action and (6) a flexibility clause. 
Besides the common competition law, the CAP, the structural/regional policy and its links with 
the EU budget it is mainly the coordination of economic policy which led to a fundamental 
change in the new Member States (for more details in the different policy areas, see Breuss, 
2003a, pp. 541-545). 
The EU Member States are integrated into EU’s budget policy (see Table 4). The member states 
pay own resources into the EU budget and get transfer payments out of it for the CAP and 
structural policy measures. All three countries were net contributors to the EU budget in the first 
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year of EU membership: Finland with -0.08 percent, Austria -0.44 percent and Sweden -0.38 
percent of GDP. Whereas Finland succeeded to keep a balanced position vis à vis the EU budget 
on average, Austria and Sweden remained net contributors. Over time Austria’s net position 
improved gradually (to -0.15 percent of GDP in 2003). Sweden, however, is still a net contributor 
into the EU budget of around -0.4 percent of GDP. Austria succeeded to draw more and more 
transfers out of the CAP budget under the title “Rural Development”. Austria ranks fourth (after 
Germany, France, Italy and Spain) in absorbing transfers for “Rural Development” in EU-15. 
 
Table 4: Relations with EU budget: Austria, Finland and Sweden 
 (Mill. Euro) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 Own resources1) 
Austria 1762.9 1874.0 2110.4 2085.8 2053.7 2093.6 2091.0 1808.7 1935.9 
Finland 887.4 964.0 1061.9 1145.8 1210.7 1225.6 1233.1 1184.6 1337.9 
Sweden 1658.3 1969.0 2326.0 2382.7 2348.8 2632.9 2337.8 2086.1 2501.3 
 Operative expenditure total2) 
Austria 902.3 1660.5 1386.8 1329.5 1242.0 1398.4 1403.3 1553.6 1576.7 
Finland 753.4 1052.0 1118.0 975.1 936.4 1396.3 1020.1 1202.5 1346.6 
Sweden 760.7 1312.5 1196.6 1343.7 1164.6 1214.5 1092.9 1245.3 1454.4 
Common agricultural policy (CAP): EAGGF- guarantee section: 
Austria 87.5 1214.1 861.3 843.2 844.4 1018.7 1052.6 1092.1 1128.1 
Finland 63.3 649.2 570.6 576.4 560.0 727.8 815.8 838.8 876.1 
Sweden 76.5 624.1 747.0 770.9 734.8 798.1 780.1 817.6 866.5 
Structural policy measures: 
Austria 175.1 270.6 364.0 340.7 296.3 260.8 206.4 185.9 300.5 
Finland 173.8 155.9 379.9 256.8 252.7 542.6 83.6 222.7 327.9 
Sweden 125.6 132.7 230.6 375.8 287.4 232.2 135.6 237.9 395.7 
 Net operative budget balance3) 
Austria -788.0 -264.5 -779.8 -629.2 -628.8 -447.8 -536.4 -223.5 -336.2 
Finland -70.6 72.6 39.8 -102.4 -194.8 274.5 -150.4 -4.1 -20.7 
Sweden -673.6 -587.9 -1097.7 -779.9 -897.3 -1059.5 -973.3 -743.4 -950.4 
 in % of GDP 
Austria -0.44 -0.15 -0.43 -0.34 -0.32 -0.22 -0.26 -0.10 -0.15 
Finland -0.08 0.08 0.04 -0.09 -0.17 0.22 -0.11 0.00 -0.01 
Sweden -0.38 -0.30 -0.54 -0.37 -0.40 -0.44 -0.42 -0.29 -0.36 
1) Own resources (transfers to EU budget) consist of: a) traditional own resources (TOR = customs and 
agricultural duties, sugar levies); b) VAT based resource; c) GNI based resource (“fourth resource”); GNI 
= gross national income. EAGGF = European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund. 
2) Here only the most important expenditure categories are mentioned (CAP, structural policy); apart from 
them there are expenditures for internal policies, administrative expenditures and reserves. 
3) Positive sign = net receiver, negative sign = net contributor. 
Sources: Allocation of 2002, 2002 and 2003 operating expenditure by Member State, European 
Commission, Brussels, September 2002, 2003 und 2004. 
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Differences – flexible integration: Two countries with, one without the Euro: Of the three 
countries surveyed, only Finland and Austria participate in Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) since the start of Stage Three on 1 January 1999. Sweden did not adopt the common 
currency out of political considerations and also based on an economic study: Calmfors et al. 
(1997) argue that the Swedish business cycle is more closely correlated with that of the UK and 
the USA than with the other EU members. In a referendum on 14 September 2003 56.1 percent 
of the Swedes refused the introduction of the Euro in its country. Precondition for entry into 
EMU was the fulfilment of the convergence criteria as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty: the 
rate of inflation, budgetary criteria (deficit and debt level), interest rates and participation in the 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of European Monetary System (EMS) without currency 
depreciation vis-à-vis member states. Sweden never participated in the ERM and thus did not 
meet one of the five convergence criteria. Sweden and also the UK have not joined the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism II (ERM II), whereby the member states not participating in EMU should tie 
their exchange rates to the euro in relatively narrow bands (up to ±15 percent); responding to a 
request from the UK, participation in ERM II is not mandatory. 
Although in principle the Member States regard economic policies „as a matter of common 
concern and shall coordinate them within the Council“ (Art. 99 ECT), only the Member States 
whose currency is the Euro are strictly involved in the asymmetric economic policy architecture 
of EMU (central monetary policy fort he members of the Euro area and decentralized fiscal 
policy, but co-coordinated via the Stability and Growth Pact – SGP; for a more detailed 
description of EU’s economic policy, see Breuss, 2002a, 2005b). This specific economic policy 
architecture of EMU is often seen as a hindrance for economic growth. The reason is that the 
SGP and also ECB’s monetary policy may be too restrictive in a phase of sluggish growth (or in a 
recession) – in particular for the large EMU countries. 
 
Euro dividend? Although EMU is relatively young, recent econometric panel estimations answer 
in the affirmative. Micco-Stein-Ordonez (2003) estimate that the bilateral trade of the 12 Euro 
zone countries was 4 to 10 percent higher compared to a situation without the Euro. According to 
estimations by Faruquee (2004) Finland has slightly lost in intra-Euro zone trade after 
participating in EMU (also Portugal). Austria, in contrast has gained by 8 percent (Euro area on 
average +7 percent). Accordingly, the biggest winners in intra-Euro area trade are Germany, the 
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Netherlands and Spain. However, in the light of the decline in trade shares with the EU since 
1995, these optimistic results should be taken with care. 
 
6. Which integration effects? 
6.1 The difficulty of isolating integration effects 
European integration is not a one-dimensional process and does not happen in a vacuum. EU 
integration is progressing and has reached a high degree of economic maturity with the 
establishment of EMU and the introduction of the Euro as a common currency. At the same time, 
EU enlargement is vividly continuing. On 1 May 2004, 10 new member states – mainly from 
Central and Eastern Europe - acceded to the EU, enlarging it from 15 to 25 Member States. In 
2007 Bulgaria and Romania will become EU members. The rest Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, FRY Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro) might follow. Croatia and Macedonia 
have already applied for EU membership. Accession negotiations with Croatia and with Turkey 
start in 2005. This might not signal the end of EU enlargement. Maybe, some of the countries, 
presently members of the “Ring of Friends” (those 16 countries, which are in the box of the 
European Neighborhood Policy – ENP – and are kept in a waiting line) might become EU 
members in the next decade. This complex development over time makes it difficult to isolate 
integration effects for single Member States of the EU. 
 
Surrounding the accession of Finland, Austria and Sweden, the following developments occurred 
inside and outside the EU: 
• In the EU, the Internal Market was established in 1993, but was implemented only gradually. 
• In 1994 the three countries entered the European Economic Area (EEA) as EFTA members. 
• In 1998, the assessment of eligibility of the member states for EMU (fulfillment of the 
convergence criteria) led to a harmonization of interest rate management and to widespread 
budgetary consolidation efforts, with substantial repercussions on the real sector of the 
economies. 
• In 1999, EMU started with 11 member states, with Greece joining subsequently in 2001. 
• On the external front, trade with the Central and Eastern European countries expanded fast 
since the opening of these economies in 1989 - particularly for those member states which 
had already before maintained close trade relations with the East, such as Finland and 
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Austria, but somewhat less Sweden. The integration effects deriving from EU accession were 
thus overlapped by the substantial expansion of trade with the East. 
• Under the impact of a global cyclical slowdown the EU economy slipped into recession in 
1993; while it has recovered since, the upturn proceeded more slowly than in the USA. 
Generally, the US economy developed much faster than those in Europe in the last decade. 
Japan has been in a deflation crisis since 1991 which could be overcome only recently. 
• In 1995 the WTO was founded and - according to the Uruguay Round Agreements - a further 
world wide trade liberalization started, bringing tariffs for manufactured goods down to 
below 3 percent on average. 
In view of this rather complex economic reality it becomes clear that, whereas an ex-ante 
evaluation of integration effects on the basis of theoretical expectations is difficult, an ex-post 
quantification of such effects is even much more ambitious. 
 
6.2 Ex-ante expectations – integration theory 
The theory of regional integration is well developed and enables concrete ex ante estimations to 
be made using computable general equilibrium (CGE) or macro-economic models. Baldwin-
Venables (1995, p. 1601) 3 derive a prototype equation incorporating all conceivable effects of 
regional integration (deduction of welfare effects from an indirect utility function). This equation 
is applied here to the integration effects in Austria, Finland and Sweden from their accession to 
the EU: 
(1) [ ] dpmttdmdmtVdV E −−−= αα/  
  [ ] dnVVdXadXatp Enxx )/(+−−++  
 dIr )1/~( −+ ρ . 
The change in welfare ( dV , d . . . difference operator) of a representative consumer in relation to 
the marginal utility of consumption expenditure ( EV ) is theoretically dependent from the 
following partial integration effects: 
• Traditional trade effects in a situation of perfect competition: the right-hand side of the first 
line in equation (1) includes the trade effects, consisting of three sub-effects: 1) a trade 
volume effect TV ( dmtα ), where t . . . vector of trade cost (tariffs, non-tariff trade barriers - 
                                                 
3 For a similar welfare analysis in case of the recent EU enlargement, see Kohler (2004). 
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NTBs), m . . . vector of net imports (+ = imports), a . . . parameter ( 1=α if tariff receipts 
accrue for the domestic economy, 0=α  trade barriers if no rents, i.e., tariff receipts accrue 
domestically); 2) a trade cost effect TC ( [ ]ttmd α−− ) and 3) a terms-of-trade effect TOT 
( mdp− ), where p . . . vector of prices at the border. 
The TV effects would only materialise if between the EU and the three new member states, before 
their accession, tariffs still existed (entry into a customs union with a common external tariff 
would produce trade creation and trade diversion effects). Actually, however, tariffs had already 
been phased out ( 0=t ) through the free trade agreements of 1973 between EC and EFTA. 
Therefore, at the entry into the Internal Market only TC effects played a role, via the dismantling 
of non-tariff trade barriers (for this reason, 0=α ), and only the term mdt−  remains relevant. EU 
accession has a welfare-enhancing effect, because trade barriers (equivalent to tariffs) such as 
trade costs of border controls are abolished. Since the three new member states are small 
countries, unable to influence world market prices and thus the terms-of-trade, the TOT effect 
also becomes zero (the third term on the right hand side in the first line of equation (1): 0=dp ). 
• Modern integration effects under imperfect competition: the second line of equation (1) 
contains three integration effects identified my modern foreign trade theory: 1) a production 
effect PE [ ]dXatp −+  (the term in brackets corresponds to profits, i.e., revenues tp +  minus 
costs a , dX  . . . change in production vector), 2) an economies-of-scale effect EOS xxdXa−  
( xa  . . . average costs, i.e., factor prices for capital and labour in sector x ) and 3) a product 
variation effect VE ( dnVV En )/( , nV  . . . marginal utility of a product variation n ). 
In theory, accession to the Internal Market may produce all three sub-effects. It leads to an 
increase in production (PE effect), and the expansion of trade within the Internal Market 
stimulates in turn intra-industry trade which itself can be explained by imperfect (monopolistic) 
competition. Integration into a larger market enables participants to benefit from EOS effects. 
The potential reinforcement of market-dominating positions may be countered by the higher 
degree of pro-competitive effects as a consequence of higher intra-EU trade (loss of monopoly 
positions). If, however, in the Internal Market the ideal of the perfect market became reality, 
prices would be equal to costs in the industrial equilibrium, implying that both PE and EOS 
effects would disappear with only the VE effect remaining. Participation in the large Internal 
Market may on the one hand entail a shift of production towards the Internal Market and, on the 
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other, the maintenance of product-related monopoly positions in favour of increasing product 
differentiation and thus a widening of product variation (VE effect). The magnitude of this effect 
is difficult to test empirically. The hypothesis by Casella (1996) whereby small countries benefit 
more from integration into a larger community than big countries, because the former should reap 
larger economies of scale, appears plausible but cannot be entirely confirmed empirically (see 
Badinger-Breuss, 2005). 
• Accumulation or growth effects AE: ( )dIr 1/~ −ρ , where r~  . . . social rate of return of capital, 
ρ  . . . rate of discount, I  . . . investment (third line in equation (1)). 
 The key question arising in the context of integration moves is whether they will boost economic 
growth. That is the case if integration leads to higher returns on investment in physical or human 
capital. A further question is whether the dynamic (or growth) effects will accrue only in the 
short run or permanently. In the former case, integration into a larger community will lead to a 
one-time level shift, e.g., of real GDP, with subsequent developments following a normal trend. 
In the latter case, growth rates of real GDP would stay permanently higher than before (higher 
steady state growth). Participation in the Internal Market also gives rise to acquisition and 
diversion of investment. While new members become attractive for foreign direct investment 
(FDI), the remaining EFTA countries see a drain in investment. In the long run, accession to the 
EU could raise the pace of growth via technical spill-overs (Coe-Helpman, 1995), either as a 
consequence of rising intra-EU trade or because of the promotion of scientific exchange (EU 
framework programmes), thereby boosting investment in research and development (R&D) and, 
indirectly, long-term economic growth. The issue of location effects accruing from EU accession 
could also be explored by the modern approach of Economic Geography (Krugman, 1991; 
Baldwin-Venables, 1995, p. 1619); this branch of trade theory is empirically still poorly 
developed (see Breuss, 2003b, pp. 218-220). 
 
Only very few CGE and macro-economic models lend themselves for quantifying all these 
theoretically conceivable integration effects. The dynamic CGE model by Keuschnigg-Kohler 
(1996) provides the best approach towards this theoretical neo-classical ideal. Before and shortly 
after joining the EU, a large number of studies on the potential integration effects of this move 
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were presented in the three new member states4. At the same time, the integration effects within 
EFTA were analysed using CGE models (e.g., Norman, 1989), or those within the EU and EFTA 
compared (Haaland, 1993). The major results for Austria, Finland and Sweden are summarised in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Estimation of integration effects ex ante: Austria, Finland and Sweden 
 Austria Finland Sweden 
 Net welfare effects as a percentage of GDP 
Flam (1995, p. 465) +0.08 +0.86 +0.22 
Keuschnigg-Kohler (1996, p. 187) +1.18 +1.00 +0.59 
 Cumulative deviation of real GDP from baseline 
scenario without EU accession, in percent 
Permanent effects 
(Alho-Erkkilä-Kotilainen. 1996; 
Widgrén, 1999, p. 83) 
 +4.20  
Effects after 6 years 
(Breuss-Kratena-Schebeck, 1994, p. S27) 
+2.80   
Long-term effects 
(Keuschnigg-Kohler, 1996, p. 169) 
+1.90   
 
All these studies held relatively high expectations from EU accession of the three countries, 
although the quantitative results were rather different. While the analysis for Austria by Breuss-
Kratena-Schebeck (1994) consisted in simulations with a joint macro-input-output model, and 
with a dynamic multi-sector CGE model by Keuschnigg-Kohler (1996), the results for the other 
countries are derived in a rather simple way from supposed trade, price and competition effects 
(e.g., Flam, 1995; also Keuschnigg-Kohler, 1996, for Finland and Sweden only derived from 
model elasticities of the Austrian model). 
 
6.3 Ex-post assessment – an integration model 
Although the theory of integration considers a host of possible effects, it is certainly easier, as 
stated above, to postulate certain integration effects ex-ante than to verify or falsify them ex-post. 
A first attempt to quantify the economic consequences of EU membership for Austria suggested 
that the expectations were largely met (Breuss, 1999b, 2000). 
                                                 
4  For a survey see Widgrén (1999) for Finland, Breuss (1995, 1996, 1999a) for Austria and Dahl (1999) as well as 
Kokko (1994) for Sweden. 
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Following the presentation of economic developments in the three new member states on the 
basis of key performance data, and the attempt of identifying integration effects by comparing the 
periods before and after accession, we now intend to estimate by a common model approach the 
impact of the different channels of integration in the three countries. For all three countries the 
same model, a small essentially supply-side-oriented macro model, is being developed and the 
necessary equations econometrically estimated for each country (see Annex). The integration 
effects are then derived via simulation5. 
 
The integration model sets off from the establishment of the EC Internal Market in 1993 and, in 
the course of time, allows the following effects being quantified: 
1) EC Internal Market – windfall gains since 1993: 
a) Acceleration of GDP growth in the EU: The assumption that over the last ten years the 
Internal Market has added 0.2 percentage point p.a. to real GDP growth in the EU is derived 
from the works of Badinger (2001, 2003). The European Commission (EU, 2002b, pp. 2-3), 
in its ex-post evaluation ”10 Years of Internal Market” based upon simulations with the 
macro model QUEST II, concludes that since 1992 EU-wide 2.5 million new jobs have been 
created and the level of real GDP in 2002 has been boosted by 1.8 percentage points or € 
164.5 billion, compared with a baseline scenario without the Internal Market6. This is in line 
with the assumption made here of an annual acceleration of EU real GDP growth by some 
0.2 percentage point. The European Commission, in its Cecchini Report, had claimed 
somewhat higher GDP effects. Catinat-Donni-Italianer (1988) found a cumulative increase in 
EU real GDP of 4.5 percent after six years7. The impact of this assumption, in the present 
model, is confined to higher exports to the EU. 
                                                 
5 The calculations presented here are based upon a method which was applied for the three countries for the first time 
in Breuss (2003a) 
6 The simulated GDP effects of participation in the EU Internal Market over 10 years are based upon the following 
inputs in the QUEST II model: a decline in price mark-ups on costs by some 0.9 percentage point due to stronger 
price competition, and an increase in total factor productivity (TFP) by around 0.5 percent due to efficiency gains 
from liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation (Roeger-Sekkat, 2002). The TFP model input results from findings 
from different studies on the impact of market opening (liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation) at the sectoral 
and the overall economic level − such as Nicoletti-Scarpetta (2003) and Salgado (2002), who both analyse the impact 
of liberalisation (reform of goods and labour markets) on TFP at the sectoral and the overall economic level using 
panel data for the OECD industrialised countries. 
7 The results of the Cecchini Report were largely confirmed by an intermediate review by the European Commission 
(EU, 1996). 
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b) Stronger competition in the financial sector since 1993: The Internal Market, and even more 
EMU, led to stronger competition in the financial sector8. It is assumed here that thereby 
long-term nominal interest rates in Germany edged down by 0.1 percentage point per year. 
This implies in the present model also a decline in interest rates in the three new member 
states, which benefited capital formation and gave a slight positive impulse to GDP growth. 
c) General increase in competition in the Internal Market since 1993: The Cecchini Report 
(Catinat-Donni-Italianer, 1988) claims that stronger competitive pressure in the Internal 
Market dampens consumer price inflation by a cumulative 6 percentage points over six 
years; this would also lead to a slower pace of export prices by 5½ percentage points9. We 
assume here that the moderation of export prices lowered import prices in the three new 
member states by 0.5 percentage point per year. The lower imported inflation exerts 
downward pressure on the domestic price level and is reflected in a deceleration of consumer 
price inflation. Only at the beginning this leads to a slight positive GDP effect which, 
however peters out over time and ends in a slight negative effect at the end of the 
simulations. 
2) EEA effects since 1994: 
The three countries examined here, as members of EFTA, participated already in 1994 in the 
EEA. Apart from the four freedoms postulated by the EEA agreement (which were, however, 
only partially implemented), it was notably competition policy that was harmonised. It is 
assumed here that this gave rise to stronger price competition already ahead of EU membership. 
This effect is taken into account through an adjustment of the mark-up in the price equation, 
leading to a change in relative factor prices. The resulting decline in the domestic price level 
raises real disposable incomes and consumer welfare. The magnitude of the competition effect is 
difficult to assess empirically10. Here, we assume a reduction in the mark-up by 15 percentage 
points since 1994. In can be expected that the mark-ups may decline further due to the increasing 
pressure from the acceding countries of Central- and Eastern Europe and in particular after their 
accession to the EU. 
                                                 
8 The growth effect of a full integration of European financial markets is estimated at around 1 percentage point 
(acceleration of GDP growth per year) for most EU member states (Gianetti et al., 2002). 
9 Allen-Gasiorek-Smith (1998) analysed the impact of the completion of the Internal Market on price-over-cost 
mark-ups for a large number of industrial sectors; they estimate the dampening effect at 3½ percent for the EU 
average. 
10 First estimates in this regard have been presented by Allen-Gasiorek-Smith (1998) after the entry into force of the 
Internal Market, albeit only for manufacturing industry. Ex post estimation results by Badinger (2004) are mixed. 
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3) EU accession in 1995: 
a) Trade effects: Both in 1994 and 1995, EU exports and imports of the three accession 
countries rose strongly, but abated subsequently towards more "normal" rates of growth. The 
equations for both real exports to and real imports from the EU include an integration 
variable as applied by Badinger (2001) for his growth estimates. The reduction in trade costs 
by around 5 percent due to the abolition of border controls is partially allowed for since 1994 
and fully since 1995. In the simulations it is assumed that without the implementation of the 
Internal Market trade costs would not have been lowered. In this way, the jump in exports 
and imports soon after EU accession is reflected by the model. However, they abated pretty 
soon, resulting only at the beginning slightly positive GDP effects. Due to EU enlargement 
in 2004 an additional integration effect occurs. 
 
Figure 7: Expenditure on research and development (R&D) 
 (As a percentage of GDP) 
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b) Endogenous growth generated by higher spending on research and development (R&D): The 
integration model presented here with a production function included treats technical 
progress as endogenous according to the method by Coe-Helpman (1995). The development 
in total factor productivity is explained by that of labour productivity and the domestic 
expenditure on research and development as well as by spill-overs of research activities from 
the EU. The R&D spill-overs are obtained by multiplying the research and 
development/GDP ratio of the EU with the share of imports from the EU as determined 
endogenously by the model. In the simulations it is assumed that by participating in the EU 
framework programmes the research and development/GDP ratio of the three new member 
states was raised by 0.1 percentage points and increasing to 0.2 percentage points from a 
baseline scenario without EU membership. From Figure 7 one sees that the trend of R&D 
expenditures is steeper since EU accession than before. According to this assumption the 
increase would have been smaller in the baseline scenario than it actually was, yielding 
strong integration effects for GDP. 
 
Table 6: Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows: Austria, Finland and Sweden 
 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 in % of GDP 
Austria:           
FDI exports: 
  EU 
  Total 
 
0.40 
1.00 
 
0.26 
0.60 
 
0.18 
0.48 
 
0.27 
0.84 
 
0.45 
0.97 
 
0.70 
1.29 
 
0.51 
0.57 
 
0.31 
3.01 
 
 
1.65 
 
 
2.75 
FDI imports: 
  EU 
  Total 
 
0.27 
0.40 
 
0.30 
0.66 
 
0.47 
0.81 
 
1.66 
1.91 
 
0.81 
1.29 
 
2.29 
2.14 
 
1.06 
1.42 
 
4.45 
4.63 
 
 
3.09 
 
 
0.74 
Finland:           
FDI exports: 
  EU 
  Total 
 
1.35 
2.31 
 
3.97 
4.28 
 
1.15 
1.15 
 
2.29 
2.81 
 
3.07 
4.31 
 
16.37 
17.70 
 
3.34 
5.17 
 
 
18.78 
 
 
6.91 
 
 
7.49 
FDI imports: 
  EU 
  Total 
 
0.59 
0.70 
 
1.15 
1.57 
 
0.48 
0.82 
 
0.99 
0.87 
 
1.37 
1.73 
 
10.98 
11.53 
 
3.44 
3.61 
 
 
6.67 
 
 
3.08 
 
 
6.92 
Sweden:           
FDI exports: 
  EU 
  Total 
 
4.66 
6.17 
 
1.48 
3.13 
 
0.64 
4.52 
 
0.31 
1.72 
 
0.60 
5.10 
 
4.30 
9.82 
 
2.77 
8.72 
 
8.66 
16.90 
 
0.14 
3.01 
 
 
4.50 
FDI imports: 
  EU 
  Total 
 
0.67 
0.83 
 
1.32 
2.97 
 
0.40 
5.82 
 
1.03 
1.87 
 
2.27 
4.43 
 
5.84 
7.99 
 
20.25 
24.19 
 
4.47 
9.67 
 
4.01 
5.37 
 
 
4.59 
Sources: Own calculations, using OECD, International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbooks, several 
annual issues, Paris; UNCTAD, World Investment Report, several issues, New York and 
Geneva. 
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c) Inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the EU: Accession to the EU markedly 
improved the attractiveness of the three new member states as investment target. Since 1995, 
there has been a massive inflow of foreign direct investment (not only) from the EU. FDI 
statistics by OECD and UNCTAD differ markedly in this regard. For the present calculations 
OECD data were used (Table 6). The FDI flows exhibit large annual fluctuations. 
Nevertheless it is assumed that EU accession led to a steady increase of additional FDI 
inflows of 0.2 percent of GDP at the beginning up to 1.5 percent of GDP recently. According 
to the underlying assumptions, the inflow of FDI stimulated capital formation and thereby – 
in our model via the production function - boosted economic growth. Without EU 
membership, so the hypothesis, FDI would have been less buoyant or would have followed 
the previous trend. The FDI inflow gives rise to substantial positive effects on GDP, 
particularly for Finland. 
d) Net contributor position vis-à-vis the EU budget: Net transfers from the EU budget (as a 
percentage of GDP; Table 4) are included in the GDP per capita in order to obtain net 
welfare measure. The latter are consistently negative for the net contributors Austria and 
Sweden, and close to zero for Finland. 
 
6.4 Overall effects 
Table 7 presents the overall effects for the major macro-economic variables for the three 
countries. It suggests that Finland recorded the strongest positive GDP effect from EU accession, 
ahead of Austria and Sweden. The ex-post effects derived here are very similar to those obtained 
by Breuss (1999b, 2000, 2003a). The reported changes to the average growth rates are not 
permanent ones, but only temporary (Figure 8; this corresponds to the results of Badinger, 2001, 
2003). After the original deadweight effects stemming from the establishment of the EC Internal 
Market in 1993 and the parallel (competition) effect of the EEA in 1994, the "genuine" effects of 
EU accession were brought to bear, which then tapered off after five to six years. Accession to 
the EU therefore did not raise the "steady state" growth rate of GDP, but was confined to a level 
shift, causing a one-time jump of the new member states' real GDP after their accession to the 
EU. Since then growth has reverted to its "normal" rate. Due to the EU enlargement of 2004 a 
new impulse occurred, strongest in Austria because Austria is the country profiting the most from 
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enlargement (see Breuss, 2002b). Since 1995 the cumulated increase of the levels of real GDP 
amounted to 4.8 percentage points in Finland, 2.8 percentage points in Austria and 2.2 percentage 
points in Sweden (see Table 7)11. 
 
Table 7: Integration effects of EU accession 
 Austria Finland Sweden 
 Average annual additional percentage change 
1995/2005 
GDP, real 
GDP, real (cumulated 1995-2005) 
0.43 
(2.84) 
0.67 
(4.82) 
0.30 
(2.20) 
Total factor productivity (TFP) 0.17 0.02 0.11 
Capital stock 0.15 0.50 0.13 
Employment 0.29 0.71 0.21 
Unemployment rate (percentage points) -0.23 -1.27 -0.35 
Rate of inflation (HICP) -0.30 -0.43 -0.45 
Unit labor cost -0.12 -0.29 -0.21 
Exports to EU, volume 0.40 0.62 0.27 
Imports from EU, volume 0.74 1.25 0.13 
Real disposable personal income 0.55 0.83 0.52 
GDP per capita, real 0.43 0.67 0.30 
GDP per capita, real including net 
transfers to EU budget 
0.31 0.59 0.24 
Source: Own estimates with the integration model (see Annex). 
 
The most important impact on economic growth derives from the "modern" integration effects 
(R&D and FDI effects). The traditional integration effects (trade effects etc.) in contrast are 
extremely small. The competition effects (decline of mark-ups) result in a dampening of price 
development. In general, the magnitude of the integration effects can never be assessed precisely, 
                                                 
11 Catinat-Donni-Italianer (1988) estimated ex ante that the completion of the Internal Market would increase real 
GDP of EU average by cumulated 4.5 percentage points after six years. By way of contrast, the European 
Commission (Roeger-Sekkat, 2002) arrived, for the EU as a whole, at a cumulative level increase in real GDP by 1.4 
percent within 10 years as a result of Internal Market integration (with a range from +0.76 percent to +2.05 percent). 
However, not all internal market effects are included in that calculation; in particular those from service sector 
liberalisation are not (yet) included. The implementation and realisation of the “Directive on services in the internal 
market” (see EU, 2004b) might induce additional intra-EU trade and FDI flows and hence also more growth and jobs 
(see the literature survey by Breuss-Badinger, 2005; for specific services studies, see Kox-Lejour-Montizaan, 2004a, 
2004b). The liberalisation of various network industries (electricity, gas, and telecommunication) should have raised 
GDP by an additional 0.6 percent over 10 years (see EU, 2002c, chapter 3). 
 Demgegenüber hat die Europäische Kommission (siehe Roeger-Sekkat, 2002) ex post für die EU insgesamt nach 10 
Jahren Binnenmarkt einen Niveauanstieg des realen BIP von 1,4 Prozentpunkten (mit einer Spannweite von 0,76% 
und 2,05%) errechnet. Allerdings sind darin nicht alle Binnenmarkteffekte enthalten. Insbesondere sind jene der 
Liberalisierung des Dienstleistungssektors nicht berücksichtigt. Weiters dürften durch die Liberalisierung diverser 
Netzwerkindustrien (Strom, Gas, Telekom) nochmals etwa 0,6 Prozentpunkte innerhalb von 10 Jahren dazu kommen 
(siehe EU, 2002c, chapter 3). 
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since the "anti-monde" situation, i.e., the behaviour of all variables without integration, is always 
unknown. 
 
Figure 8: Integration effects of EU accession 
 (Real GDP, additional percentage change from previous year) 
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Source: Own estimates with the integration model (see Annex). 
 
Yet, the results are, against the background of the ex-ante estimates, not altogether implausible. 
No economic model can ever incorporate all theoretically conceivable integration effects, let 
alone deliver precise quantitative estimates ex-post for them. A non-model-based approach of 
assessing integration effects would consist in comparing the economic performance of the three 
new member states with selected reference countries outside the EU − as has been done in the 
introductory part of this paper, with the USA and Switzerland as the reference cases. However, 
even following that approach, the differences between the EU "ins" and the EU "outs" can never 
be entirely attributed to integration effects. 
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7. Future perspectives 
The fourth EU enlargement in 1995 was comfortable in many respects for the European Union. It 
involved small, highly developed rich industrial countries which were already integrated into the 
EU to a considerable degree via the Free Trade Agreements of 1973 and the EEA of 1994. 
Additionally, all three are net contributors to the EU budget. The only obstacle is that Sweden is 
not (yet) a member of the Euro area. For the newcomers EU accession was – on average - a 
positive experiment, too. EU membership resulted – to a different degree – in an increase of real 
GDP. Surprisingly, the theoretically expected increase of trade with the EU (trade creation) did 
not materialize. In contrast to the positive economic effects of EU membership one can observe 
an increasing EU scepticism of the population in all three countries (the least in Finland). It 
seems that new EU members have to live with such paradoxes. 
The specific Austrian, Finnish and Swedish experiences after 10 years of EU membership are 
therefore only partially applicable to the 10 new EU Member States. On the one hand the 2004 
EU enlargement encompassed primarily small and poor transformation countries which are still 
in a process of catching up. For a long time they will burden and not relieve the EU budget. The 
EU-25 is more heterogeneous and segmented than EU-15 and hence will revive the process of 
“flexible integration”. Until the take-over of the Euro – and that lasts at least until 2007 – we will 
have more countries outside the Euro area (13) than in the Euro area (12). The huge income 
differential potentially leads to migration, a problem which has been mitigated and delayed by the 
seven years transitional arrangements in the accession treaty. On the other hand, the integration 
of the 10 newcomers into the Internal Market leads to a growth impulse to the economy of the 
enlarged Union; however, the growth effect is around ten times larger in the new Member States 
than in the old EU Member States (see Breuss, 2002b). Low wages und a rapid growing economy 
makes the new member states to “emerging markets” within the Union. 
Besides the irresistible drive to EU enlargement – the next enlargement by Bulgaria and Romania 
is planned for 2007, further countries (Croatia, FRY Macedonia and Turkey) will follow – the 
question of institutional and political reform of the Union is on the agenda. With the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), planned to enter into force – after the completion 
of the complicated ratification procedure (10 member states make referenda) - this should be 
solved for the time being. 
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Annex: A common integration model for Austria, Finland and Sweden 
1. Production function (Cobb-Douglas): 
αα −= 1LKTFPGDP  
GDP = real GDP; TFP = total factor productivity (technical progress); K = capital stock, volume; 
L = employment; α  = factor shares in national income (net national product) 
 
2. Total factor productivity (TFP): 
)log(),&log(*),&log(),(log()log( 1−= TFPDRmDRAPfTFP EUii  
R&D = research and development expenditure, as a percentage of GDP; AP = labor productivity; 
im  = share of EU imports of country i in total imports; i = countries (Austria, Finland and 
Sweden). 
 
3. Domestic price (private consumption deflator): 
))log(),log(),log(*()log( 1−= PKdPMdULCdmufPKd  
PK = private consumption deflator; mu = mark-up (dummy for price competition); ULC = unit 
labor cost (compensation of employees as a percentage of GDP, volume); PM = import deflator. 
 
4. Consumer prices (harmonized): 
)log(()log( PKdfHICPd =  
HICP = harmonized index of consumer prices. 
 
5. GDP deflator: 
))log(),log(),log(()log( PMdPXdPKdfPGDPd =  
PGDP = GDP deflator; PX = export deflator. 
 
6. Per-capita wages (Phillips curve): 
))log(),/1(),log(),log(()log( 1−= LBdUAPdHICPdfLBd  
LB = wages (W) per employee (L); U = unemployment rate. 
 
7. Demand for capital (private sector): 
),),log(),log(,()log( LBRFDIdGDPdBudfKd =  
Bud = general government balance, as a percentage of GDP; FDI = inflow of FDI from EU, as  a 
percentage of GDP; R = long-term nominal interest rate. 
 
8. Interest rate, long-term: 
),),( 1−= RRGDPNfR D  
DR  = interest rate in Germany. 
 
9. Demand for labor: 
)log(),log(),log(()log( 1−= LdLBdGDPdfLd  
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10. Labor productivity: 
LGDPAP /=  
 
11. Unit labor cost: 
GDPWLGDPLBULC /)//( ==  
 
12. Unemployment rate (Okun relation): 
)),log(( 1−= UGDPdfU  
 
13. Exports to EU, volume: 
)),log(),log(()log( PROTREERdGDPdfXd EUEU =  
EUX  = real exports to EU; EUGDP  = EU real GDP; REER = real-effective exchange rate 
(relative consumer prices in a common currency); PROT = protectionism dummy (reduction in 
tariffs and trade cost). 
 
14. Imports from EU, volume: 
))log(,),/log(),log(()log( 1−= EUEU MdPROTPGDPPMdGDPdfMd  
EUM  = imports from EU, volume. 
 
15. Share of imports from EU: 
WEUi MMm /=  
WM  = total imports, volume. 
 
16. Total exports, volume: 
))log(,),log(),log(()log( 1−= WEUW XdPROTREERdGDPdfXd  
WX  = total exports, volume. 
 
17. Total Imports, volume: 
))log(,),/log(),log(()log( 1−= WW MdPROTPGDPPMdGDPdfMd  
 
18. Personal disposable income, nominal: 
),( 1−= YDGDPNfYD  
YD = personal disposable income; GDPN = nominal GDP. 
 
19. Personal disposable income, real: 
PKYDYDR /=  
 
20. GDP, nominal: 
PGDPGDPGDPN *=  
 
21. GDP, real per capita: 
POPGDPGDPpc /=  
GDPpc = real GDP per capita; POP = population. 
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22. GDP, real per capital including net transfers to EU: 
POPPGDPNZGDPGDPpcEU /))/(( +=  
NZ = net transfers from EU budget. 
 
All equations were estimated econometrically with OLS using the programme EViews5.0 on the basis of 
annual data (whenever available) from 1960 until 2005. The different dummy variables as necessary for 
each of the three countries to accommodate for special factors are not reproduced here; logd = rate of 
change; the primary data source was the AMECO databank of the European Commission; additionally 
some data stem from OECD Economic Outlook, various issues, or: http://www.sourceoecd.org. 
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